The decision to carry out the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 wasn’t as valid as we have been led to believe. In fact, the case against that decision, and the explanations given to us for its implementation, tells another story entirely.
Use this link to see a World War II 1945 Timeline
This article, # 2 of a 3-part series on this topic, gives a list of leading questions followed by the answers I have found in my research. In the end, I hope that using such a format will offer the reader a fairly simple and understandable response to the ultimate question of: Was Truman’s atomic bombings of Hiroshima Nagasaki justified? If you care to read the other two sections of the series, click on the article titles listed below:
Article # 1: “Truman’s Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb” (An initial topic examination and article rationale)
Article # 3: “Hiroshima Nagasaki Viewpoints: Atomic Bombing Decision” (Quotes from important voices. Probably the most critical of all the arguments against using the bomb)
Originally, the creation of U.S. atomic bombs through the Manhattan Project was set up in order to beat the Germans to the punch in the development of their own nuclear weapons. But once Germany was knocked out of the war there was only one target left: Japan. And in that focus arises some interesting possible motivations in the final decision-making process regarding the actual use of such horrific tools of war. You will find those mixed within the following question and answer presentation.
More on the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
What was Truman’s public reasoning for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
The Japanese military and the Japanese people would have fought fanatically if their homeland was invaded. In using the atomic bomb, the United States saved the Japanese people from utter destruction and the lives of 500,000 American military personnel.
What else does history show us most likely impacted Truman’s decision to carry out the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
- Revenge
Although Americans hated the Nazis, that feeling went much deeper in relation to Japanese people, including Japanese Americans, because of Pearl Harbor and the Bataan Death March, as well as the torture and murder of U.S. prisoners of war.
- Racism
The revenge factor against the Japanese, and Japanese Americans, was undoubtedly augmented by the intensely racist views of many white Americans. This played out in real life during World War II in the addition to the atomic bombings with the prison camp interments in the United States for anyone who had even the smallest portion of Japanese blood in their veins, whether they were citizens or not.
That turned out to be more than 100,000 people. Even more importantly, the documented racism of President Harry Truman might well have been a factor in his decision to drop the atomic bombs on Japan.
3. The U.S. decision to begin bombing cities late in the war instead of focusing on military, transportation and industrial targets
The fire-bombings of Dresden in Germany, and in Japan late in the war, crossed a previously established moral barrier that allowed Truman to target Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In fact, the U.S. plan in case there was no Japanese surrender after the initial nuclear attacks was to drop even more atomic bombs on other Japanese cities during the rest of August and into September.
- The influence of Secretary of State, James Byrnes
Byrnes, a former judge and politician from South Carolina, was a very close advisor to President Truman even before he became Secretary of State. Truman trusted and depended on Byrnes, especially regarding international relations, one of the many areas where the President had little knowledge or experience.
It was Byrnes’ hard line on the Japanese and the possible atomic bombings that Truman adopted while disregarding contrary viewpoints from many of his other advisors, including Dwight D. Eisenhower. See also, part 3 of this series, “Hiroshima Nagasaki Viewpoints: Atomic Bombing Decision” (Quotes from important voices. Probably the most critical of all the arguments against using the bomb)
- The political momentum of the Manhattan Project (Code name for building the atomic bomb)
The Manhattan Project cost $2 billion in 1940s dollars over a 4-year period. Today that cost would be close to $28 billion. At the peak of its efforts, The Project directly employed over 120,000 people. But if you include contractors and the total number of people employed over time, the figure grows to over 600,000. And creating a ratio comparing that figure to the U.S. population at the time shows that 1 in every 250 people in the United States were in one way or another employed by the Manhattan Project.
With that much invested in time, effort and dollars, justification for such an expenditure without carrying out final atomic bombings might well have been politically expensive for Truman and a lot of other people.
- Containing the Soviet Union
Although the Soviet Union was an ally to the United States during WWII, it was still an aggressive dictatorship with designs on turning the world towards communism. It was clear to Truman that when the war ended, the Soviets would make a move on China, Korea and Japan, as well as Eastern Europe. Therefore, it was always a delicate balance for the United States to get the most out of Russia in fighting the Germans, and then eventually the Japanese, while still coming out of the war able to fully confront the coming Soviet expansion.
7. Preventing an arms race after the war was over
Once Truman told the Soviets about the development of the American atomic bomb, he knew that Stalin would immediately move to create his own nuclear weapons. The president believed this was true whether the U.S. used its bombs on Japan or not. The atomic genie would be out of the bottle and a world arms race could greatly endanger the United States as well as the rest of the planet.
The way to stop that eventuality, so the logic erroneously went, was for the United States to quickly and ruthlessly carry out atomic bombings, thus bullying the Soviets, and others, preventing them from pursuing nuclear weapons.
What information/advice appears to have been ignored by Truman?
- Contrary views
Many people who knew about the atomic bomb before Hiroshima and Nagasaki, including scientists working on the Manhattan Project, Truman’s military advisors and members of the British government, advised against its use. Click here for part 3 of this series on viewpoints about the bombings.
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Casualty estimates
The number Truman gave as possible American deaths in an invasion of the Japanese homeland varied over time from 200,000 to 500,000. In his 1955 memoir, he said that General George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, told him the figure was 250,000.
However, during the war, the Joint War Plans Committee reported to the Army Chief of Staff that the estimated death toll would be 49,000, quite a discrepancy. Not only that, but the U.S. Bombing Survey, after viewing the results of the fire-bombed cities in Japan, reported that the war would be over between November and December of 1945 even without conducting atomic bombings.
- Japan’s readiness to end the war
By the summer of 1945, Japan was a nation very close to defeat. Its navy, air force and 67 of its cities had been destroyed, a U.S. naval blockade was strangling its already fragile economy and the island of Okinawa was shaping up to be a nearby base of operations for a full invasion of the Japanese homeland.
The United States had broken the Japanese code making highly sensitive information available to the allies, some of which indicated a desire to end the war. That information correlated with other data supplied by U.S. allies, making a Japanese surrender a very real possibility.
The sticking point, however, was the allied demand that any such surrender had to be “unconditional,” which to the Japanese meant the deposing, and possible execution, of the emperor.
With the emperor’s exalted position in Japanese society, that demand was unacceptable and led to a mindset of fierce resistance by Japan’s entire population in the event of an invasion.
Even knowing the effect of “unconditional surrender” on the Japanese people and realizing the emperor would be needed to help manage a post-war Japan, President Truman never wavered from that stance. So consequently, once Japan did surrender, the emperor was allowed to maintain his position, although greatly reduced in authority: Something that, if agreed to by Truman previously, might well have prevented the atomic bombings.
- The possible full effect of the Soviet Union entering the war
Well before President Truman told Stalin about the U.S. atomic bomb, Stalin had promised to enter the war against Japan 3 months from the date Germany was defeated. On May 7, 1945, Germany surrendered to the allies and on May 9 to the Soviets. Those two dates placed a Russian invasion of Japan somewhere between August 7 and 9.
The United States successfully detonated a test atomic bomb within the United States in July of 1945 and notified Stalin of that fact at the Potsdam conference that same month. Up until that point, Truman had cautiously counted on the promised Russian help. Afterward, however, he figured the United States could bring the war in the Pacific to an end without Soviet assistance and allowing Russia to extend its influence into Japan.
On July 26, the United States, China and the United Kingdom issued a final demand for Japan’s “unconditional” surrender. The Japanese leaders refused to abide by that demand. As a result, on August 6, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and then again, three days later, on August 9 over Nagasaki. In the middle of those two dates, on August 8, Russia declared war on Japan.
Stalin had followed through with his promise, enough to help induce Japan to end the war but too late for the Soviet Union to benefit from a full invasion. Japan accepted unconditional surrender to the allies on August 14.
Truman’s geopolitical decision deliberately ignored clear evidence that Japan wanted to surrender and probably would have done so quickly after a Russian invasion without the horrific loses incurred through the atomic bombings.
- Demonstrating the power of the United States
Suggestions were made, especially by Manhattan Project scientists, to explode a nuclear weapon on a deserted Pacific island with Japanese, Russian and other observers in attendance before dropping any on cities. In that way, so the idea went, the demonstration would clearly show the superiority of the United States and its willingness to wage total war.
What did a post-war assessment of Japan by the U.S. Bombing Survey in 1946 show?
Japan would have surrendered even without the use of the atomic bombs and the Russian invasion.
Why was the bombing of Nagasaki so controversial?
Nagasaki was bombed on August 9, 1945, 3 days after the destruction of Hiroshima on August 6. The rationale for that event by the U.S. was the absence of an immediate surrender by Japan. 3 days.
The facts on the ground in Japan were that it took time for Japanese leaders to even understand what happened, no less make a reasonable assessment of damages and lives lost. With the utter destruction of Hiroshima, all communications with Tokyo were cut. On top of that, the deep divisions within the Japanese government greatly complicated decision-making.
U.S. decision makers, on the other hand, had to be fully aware of the reasons for a delayed Japanese response. This meant that the bombing of Nagasaki was either done as pure revenge or as another geopolitical statement to the Soviets, letting them know who the top dog in the world now was and how ruthless that top dog could be. Or it could have easily been both those reasons. In any event, 75,000 people paid the ultimate price for such thought processes.
Below is a 48-minute presentation by National Geographic. Includes information on Hiroshima, various aspects of the war in the Pacific and decision-making relating the atomic bombings. [Caution: Very graphic in parts)
What U.S. military action took place after the Nagasaki bombing?
To hurry the surrender process after the bombing of Nagasaki, the U.S. launched a conventional fire-bombing raid of Japanese cities causing 15,000 more deaths.
What was the unintended consequence of dropping atomic bombs on Japan?
If the United States had agreed to the Japanese condition of preserving the emperor after the war, something they knew they needed to do anyway, Japan would have surrendered before any atomic bombs were dropped or a Russian declaration of war could take place.
The resulting allied and Japanese deaths from not taking this route can be laid squarely at the feet of revenge, racism, ineptitude and politics.
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Note: As valuable as the previous information in this article is, perhaps the most important of all are the opinions expressed about the atomic bombings by people who were close to the situation. You will find such opinions in the final article of this series titled:
“Hiroshima Nagasaki Viewpoints: Atomic Bombing Decision” (Quotes from important voices. Probably the most critical of all the arguments against using the bomb)
And if you have not yet viewed the first article in this series, you will find it here:
“Truman’s Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb” (An initial topic examination and article rationale)
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